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Introduction*
One of the major issues on the international commodity sector relates to the proposition that there has been a significant downward trend in the prices of primary goods, at least in the period since the Second World War. This virtually established proposition* is now overshadowed by the recently growing concern that raw mate rials demand in the developed market economy countries (DMECs) has been slowing down con siderably and that the very factors responsible for this would soon begin to affect the develop ing countries' demand to such a degree that the world consumption of materials and thus the future prospects of commodity-producing coun tries would be seriously restricted.
The reasons for believing in -a long-term deterioration in commodity prices from the Third World perspective are well known. They include low prices and poor income-elasticity of the demand for commodities as compared with manufactures, and the asymmetric impact of trade-union power in developed countries and labour surplus in developing countries on the division of the benefits of increased productivity. In addition to these familiar factors, other struc tural elements have gained increasing impor tance in recent years.
Deep in the process of structural transfor mation in commodity demand there are said to be at least three factors at work: i) the general shift of GDP towards the service sector, which commonly consumes a smaller volume of raw materials than the manufacturing sector; ii) the "de-materialization" of production processes which consists of a shift in the composition of demand away from the products of industrial activities which consume more raw materials; and iii) the reduction or eventual elimination of the raw materials consumed in the manufacture of existing or emerging products through substi tution of other materials in those products and
•The author wishes u> express his gratitude to H éctor Assael and Armando Di Filippo for their very helpful comm ents, 'R ecent studies (Sapford, 1985; G rilli and Y ang, 1988) , though nut necessarily agreeing on the magnitude of the decline, support the proposition originally advanced by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950 a) of the longstanding price deterioration. through more intensive or more economical use of the materials: materials saving or materials economy. Reduced growth in the demand for traditional metals and some agricultural pro ducts result from the interaction of these factors. On the supply side, the most remarkable devel opments have been the accelerated production of a number of commodities, particularly agricultu ral ones, and continuous improvements in pro ductivity, both in developed and in developing countries, through the use of new production technologies.T he emergence and spread of new technolo gies have a strong bearing on the export pros pects of developing countries. While the competitive advantages deriving from the abun dance of natural resources and manpower in these countries may be eroded by these techno logical changes, they also offer new production and export opportunities if they are developed in time and properly exploited. Which of the two scenarios is more probable is a question of great socioeconomic importance, particularly for Latin America and the Caribbean, whose exports con sist mainly of commodities and whose manufac turing sector has a strong commodity-based bias.
The scope of the term "new technologies" is diverse and encompasses a broad range of activi ties (see U N C T A D , 1984). The new develop ments most often cited are microelectronics, biotechnology and materials technology. The use of microelectronics in a great variety of activities reflects its penetration capacity and its main use in the commodity sector has been in agriculture (for example, irrigation, livestock supervision and crop control). With microelectronics, pro duction processes have become highly auto mated, and in most cases more capital-intensive, producing an impact on demand and supply, not only in production itself but also in efficiency gains in stock management and other adminis trative reorganization procedures.
is important to note that the factors which seem to have gained imptirtance in recent years did not escape the critical eyes of Prebisch (1951) and H.W. Singer < 1950 b) . As early as 35 years ago, they pointed to a possible decline in demand for commodities due to technological changes leading to a reduction in the raw materials intensity of certain production processes and to competition from synthetics and substitutes.
The so-called information revolution has also had a strong impact on the financial aspects of the commodity sector. High-speed and cheaper data processing has facilitated portfolio selection among a variety of financial products and commodities. It also has facilitated the intro duction of "programme trading". The world wide round-the-clock trading system organized for gold, petroleum, bonds, stocks and commodi ties has encouraged institutional investors to try to make profits by revolving their funds in a very short time, making commodity prices more volatile.
In biotechnology, besides the traditional bio logical processes (bread, cheese, beer, wine, etc.) , the latest advances in molecular biology, bio chemistry and microbiological genetics have found extensive laboratory applications, some of them on a commercial scale. The most decisive impact of biotechnology development should be in agriculture, with crop farming alone account ing for more than 60% of the potential market, estimated at US$50 billion a year (Ahmed, 1988) . In agriculture, in almost every aspect of cash crops, there are tantalizing prospects of improving the yields, the production based on renewable resources, and human welfare. Bio processing in the areas of synthetic fuels, mate rials recovery (for example, minerals recovery in mining by "bacterial leaching") and elsewhere has a broad range of actual and potential applications.
Materials technologies, such as those used in fine ceramics, optical fibres, plastics^ and com posite materials, have led to improvements in the quality of many products and to lower manu facturing costs by saving energy and material inputs, reduced weights, increased scope for manufacturing activities in small and medium->A must notable product replacing traditional non-fuel mate rials is plastics. On a volume basis, the United States consumption of plastics now exceeds that of steel, copper and aluminium combind. It is known that at least one-fourth of all plastics and resins produced in this country displace nun-fuel mineral materials. Poly mer materials have already replaced about 7% to 9% of the steel consumed in domestic motor vehicle production and may displace more than double that amount by 2000. In the construction indus try, it is estimated that polymers have replaced slightly less than 10% of the steel consumed and by 2000 could displace as much as 13%. (Fraser and others, 1987.) sized markets, and, most importantly, increased invention of new products. These new materials technologies are believed to encourage the dis placement of traditional materials (for example, optical fibres vs. copper in telecommunications," * fine ceramics, plastics and composites vs. steel and aluminium in car manufacturing), but they also create a new demand for certain commodities.
As some studies (Pérez, 1986 , UNCTAD, 1986 suggest, the socioeconomic impact of new technologies will differ according to the extent to which the technology in question influ ences the existing "techno-economic" system. Allowing for the danger of oversimplification and their possible interrelation, there are at least three distinct categories of technological change: i) gradual innovation^ entailing small improve ments in the existing array of processes and products in different industries; ii) radical inno vation^ entailing the development of fundamen tal new materials such as polyethylene or completely new products such as optical fibres, fine ceramics, etc; and iii) technological revolu tion^ such as the introduction of steam power, internal combustion engines, electricity, Besse mer steel production, mass-production assembly lines, microelectronics, and possibly supercon ductivity, which have all entailed or are expected to entail profound and far-reaching production changes throughout the economy. The present study focuses mainly on the first two categories, which have had a pervasive impact so far on the raw materials exports of developing countries, but it by no means underestimates the signifi cance of the third category of technological development for the prospects of the interna tional commodities sector.
I

Nature and characteristics of world technological change and its impact on commodity demand and supply
This paper focuses mainly on technological changes affecting the demand for commodity exports from developing countries. This approach to the subject therefore leaves out a wide range of changes on the supply side. Although such issues as the impact of technolog ical change on production through improved productivity or the creation of new products or production methods are complex in nature and too many in number to be fully documented here, some illustrative cases are still worth mentioning.
■*30016 experts predict that the displacement of the copper market by optical fibres in the six DMliCs (United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and Japan) by about 230 000 tons by 1990 and a little over 300 000 tons by 1995, is equivalent to 4.3% and 5.6% respectively of the total copper consumption that would have been projected for these six countries for the two years, assuming no technological "leap frogging'" in fibre optics (Takeuchi and others, 1986 ).
techn ological developm ents on the supply side o f com modities a) Minerals and metals
In the mining and metal-working sectors, apart from the advances in mineral exploration, most of the new technologies currently in use have emerged or have been improved during the last decade, after the first oil price increase, in order to save energy, reduce operating costs and improve quality. These innovations, in turn, have had two major effects: on the one hand, they have made metals more competitive, thereby resisting the loss of segments of their traditional markets threatened by economic recession and the growth of substitutes; and on the other, they have achieved savings raw mate rials in the production and manufacturing stages.
Developments in the iron and steel industry are instructive. The technology of the processing and beneficiation of iron ore has enabled the industry to lower its production costs for prim ary iron by reducing the ore input required per unit of primary iron output. Owing to improved furnace technology and stricter market require ments regarding use and quality of ore, the aver age ratio between the iron ore feed and the pig iron produced declined from 1.95 in 1955 to 1.88 in 1975 and to 1.81 in 1985 . The rise in the average grade of iron ore worldwide (average percentage Fe content) was from 48% in 1955 to 59% in 1985 (U N C T A D , 1986 b). A series of coincidental developments, such as the emer gence of "new mini-steel works" and the wides pread adoption of electric-arc furnaces and continuous casting, have adversely affected iron ore demand in recent years through the minimi zation of inputs, while at the same time improv ing product range and quality.
With regard to other metals (for aluminium and copper, see UNIDO, 1989; Brown and McKern, 1987 ; E C L A C , 1989), though the availa ble mining and processing technologies are in a process of continuous evolution, current devel opments are in most cases modifications of established techniques rather than entirely new processes. In view of this, the main constraints on the adoption of new technologies, at least in the primary stage of metal processing may be due not so much to their complexity and unavail ability as to the large capital outlays which they entail.
b) Agricultural products
In agriculture the most remarkable changes centered around the "Green Revolution". This was manly concentrated in some developing countries of South and South-east Asia and Latin America and was based on the development, spread and adoption of modern high-yielding varieties, particularly of rice, wheat and maize, combined with increased use of inorganic fertil izers and irrigation. Various studies (a summary is provided in IDB, 1986) on Latin American agriculture support the view that during the last two decades the use of non-traditional inputs and technological change have played a much more important role than other factors such as acreage and manpower increases. Now the Green Revolution seems to have run its course, and the yield-enhancing potential of mechanical and chemical inputs may be lar gely exhausted. Fears of inability to sustain a high growth rate in agriculture and of continued population growth, coupled with falling produc tivity have shifted attention increasingly to sup port for agricultural research on biotechnology, in the hope of an upsurge in productivity in both developed and developing countries.
Even though the routine cultivation of biotechnologically transformed plants is not expected before the mid-1990s, now is the time to evaluate its possible socioeconomic impacts, in order to implement appropriate measures before structural rigidities are firmly established. The new biorevolution must be harnessed and properly directed because it harbours not only certain unfavourable possibilities such as the dis placement of the labour force and a more "closed" scientific circuit,^ ^ but also positive potential for the poor of the Third World. This includes reduced dependence on agrochemical inputs, with substantial cost reductions, general gains in-productivity and a wider variety of food products more in keeping with local tastes and 'A s pointed out by som e (Buttel and others, 1985; Ahmed 1988) , a feature of the Biorevolution, which differentiates it sharply from the Green Revolution, is its predominantly private character. M ajor actors in biotechnology are transnational corpora tions which have managed to com bine their in-house research capabilities, equity interests in genetic engineering venture firms, seed company ownership and access to university research via funding arrangem ents. T h e Cireen Revolution was, on the other hand, conceived and im plem ented within an institutional structure consisting mainly o f public and quasi-public organizations, where the governm ents of developing countries and their national genetic program m es participated as clients.
''According tp UNIDO, there exists a wide N orth-South gap in biotechnological research capacity. R ecent surveys of com panies involved in biotechnology show that only 20 out of a world total of 1 036 companies are in the Third World, A characteristic trend in recent years has been the acquisition of a large number of seed companies by transnational firms, particularly pharmaceutical and petrochemical companies. Because biotechnology involves the ability to link new varieties of seed to the use of specific fertilizers and pesticides, their supply o f such seeds is claimed to enable the transnationals to expand a m arket for other agricultural inputs. A lop-sided research capacity is also reflected in Ahm ed's assertion (1988) that there has been an outflow o f genetic resources from the "gene-rich" South to the "gene-poor'' N orth. It is estim ated that 90')? of all germ plasm (total genetic variety available to a species) came from the Third W orld, because the tem perate zones have lost almost all of their phytogenetic resources under the weight of the glaciers. Som e 40% of that germ plasm ended up in the gene banks of Europe and N orth America, while another 40% was stored by international agricultural research centres (lARCs). Only 15*^ was stored directly in the gene banks o f developing countries.
conditions and a shorter time-lag in the adoption of biotechnology by small farmers than in the case of the Green Revolution.
Structural changes influencing commodity consumption patterns a) Sectoral changes
For a broad range of raw materials exported by developing countries the growth of demand in the DMECs in recent years has been either stagnant or falling. In the 1960s, for instance, when GDP of the DMECs grew at 4.3 % annually, consumption of many commodities, in particular minerals and metals, increased faster than GDP. In the following decade, in contrast, while the average economic growth rate of these countries dropped to about one-half the 1960s level, the consumption growth rate fell even more sharply. During the 1970s many commodities even recorded negative growth rates. The decline in commodity demand seems to have intensified in the 1980s, after the record rises for petroleum and most metals which resulted in the more rapid development and adaptation of materials-saving technologies and materials substitution.
In addition to the increased services-sector orientation of industrial economies which is believed to be at least partially responsible for the declining trend in demand,^ the change in GDP patterns has been accompanied by marked changes within the manufacturing sector. An examination of the growth of domestic demand in volume terms by industries in selected DMECs for the period 1972-1982, as shown in table 1, sheds light on this aspect. Strong-demand indus tries include electrical equipment, electronics, information technology, automated office equip ment, precision instruments, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Demand for this group of pro-A s a r e f l e c t i o n o n t h e is s u e , D u n c a n ( 1 9 8 8 ) p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e s h a r e o f s e r v i c e s i n ( í N P o f t h e D M E C s h a s b e e n i n c r e a s i n g f o r s o m e t im e , i n s o m e o f t h e m r e a c h i n g a h i g h p e r c e n t a g e b e f o r e 1 9 7 3 . H e e x p l a i n s t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n a n d ( > N P is n o n -l i n e a r , a n d t h a t a n i n d u s t r i a l e c o n o m y g r o w s r a p i d l y -a b o v e a ( ! N P g r o w t h r a t e o f 2 -2 , V / ? -w h e n it s m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r is b ( K ) m i n g , a n d c o n v e r s e l y , a t l o w ( I D P g r o w t h r a t e s s e r v i c e s g r o w m o r e q u i c k l y . ducts grew on average by 6.7% during the period. In contrast, moderate-demand indus tries, such as rubber, plastics and transport equipment, had a growth rate of 2.5%, and weak-demand industries, such as textiles and metal products, grew by 1.1%. This observation endorses the generally accepted view that, at least for the DMECs, growth has been poor in raw materiais-intensive industries, and that a high level of performance has been found in high-technology industries with a low materials to value-added ratio.
Meanwhile, developing countries as a whole have faired substantially better in those indus trial areas where the DMECs have seemingly been losing their comparative advantage. A comparison of the estimated percentage changes in value-added for the 28 branches of industry in the ISIC for 1976-1985 and 1985-1988, shows that the raw materiais-intensive industries such as food, beverages, wearing apparel, wood and wood products, paper and paper products, rubber products, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals, have shown relatively high growth rates for the Third World as a whole. In most cases these rates are significantly higher than the rates of countries in the North (UNIDO, 1987, p. 8) . This phenomenon certainly reflects the chang ing structure of international trade and produc tion, as well as the structural adjustment processes under way, especially in the DMECs, The intrasectoral transformation in manu facturing has been facilitated by the steady pro gress made in information technologies and automation. In turn, the general tendency towards more automated and continuous, and more diversified, production processes increases the demand for most metals in the hightechnology and special steels and alloys catego ries, owing to the high strength and low weight of their alloys and superalloys, and because they are used in high-speed, hot-work special machine tools or in special anti-corrosion applications.
A good example of the unimpressive recent demand for major traditional non-ferrous metals of general uses, compared to that of hightech metals, is the United States domestic con sumption pattern of 12 metals between 1972 and 1982. Only four of them exhibited positive con sumption growth; aluminium, the platinumgroup metals (including iridium, palladium and platinum only), titanium and tungsten. Con sumption of the remaining eight metals decreased at average annual rates varying from 1% (copper) to 5% (manganese, tin and zinc). Two of the four metals with growth in consump tion derived it primarily from single markets: aluminium for metal cans, and platinum for cata lytic converters. Only titanium and tungsten showed increased consumption in a variety of end-uses during this period (United States Bureau of Mines, 1986 a). The same data also confirm that total consumption and consump tion per unit of output decreased for all metals except titanium, tungsten and the platinumgroup metals.
In sum, the older non-ferrous metals have been affected to a greater extent and this cate gory of metals has also been the most affected by substitutions in favour of light and specialty metals. Major substitutions among metals in favour of the older ones have been less frequent, as light and specialty metals usually find metal substitutes within their own category.
It is worth noting that Latin America's share in world reserves of new and other minerals such as chromite, cobalt, tantalum, vanadium, tungsten, zirconium and platinum metals is negligible and that only molybdenum (26% ), columbium (78% ) and silver (29% ) held substantial shares in these reserves in (Kiirsten and others, 1988 . In this sense, a strategy based on the exploitation of these nontraditional materials and the exercise of possible bargaining power due to concentration of supplies is not likely to be a viable development route for the region. Table 1 , 1972-1982 (Percentages) Cited in UNIDO (1 9 8 7 ).
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b) Materials substitution
The process of substitution in commodities embraces different types of phenomena, and its complexity is well documented in Tilton (1983) . In some cases, although the competing materials perform essentially the same function (for example, the use of an aluminium beer can instead of a glass bottle), the selection is made on the basis of cost-effectiveness, efficiency or spe cific properties. In some substitution processes consumption is reduced (increased) by augment ing (reducing) non-material inputs such as labour, capital and energy. A clear example is the hand-soldering of household electrical goods, which requires less solder than more automated production using printed circuit boards. Produc ers of these products, however, have favoured the latter despite their higher materials intensity because they cut labour costs. In some substitu tions what is changed is not the manufacturing process or the materials used in production but rather the use of the materials as a result of changes in the composition of the goods and services which they provide (for example, satel lites vs. underground cables for long-distance communication).
And in other cases, substitution takes place when a technological innovation allows a pro duct to be made with less material, perhaps adding new properties to it or improving the existing ones. This series of substitutions thus produces materials-saving effects, as mentioned earlier, and quality alterations. In the United States, thinwall casting, coupled with the down sizing of automobiles, has brought the weight of zinc diecastings used in American-manufactured cars down from 51 pounds in 1975 to 23 pounds per vehicle in 1983 (United States Bureau of Mines, 1986 a). The technological innovations in the zinc diecasting industry which made thinwall casting possible enabled zinc to gain an increas ing share of the metal-casting market, but at the same time it brought about a much more effi cient use of the metal with the result that less zinc is used in the process.
The behaviour of commodity markets tends to raise doubts about the assumption of conven tional thinking that the functional relationship between price and demand is automatically reversible. In these markets, if a material loses a particular market, even temporarily, that market might be gone forever. It is quite possible that an industry will not recapture a market lost when it raises prices even if it subsequently lowers them to the previous level. The assessment of this reversibility becomes much more difficult for the medium or long term, during which the demand for plant, equipment and technology can change significantly. Even in the short run, when the cost of a particular material input contributes little to the production cost of many finished products, changes in materials prices alone do not usually generally produce major shifts in the output of final goods or services. It is more likely in the short run that relative price changes affect the degree of utilization of secondary markets (scrap) when this option exists.® A material's demand curve is generally assumed to be continuous and smooth. However, given the nature of materials substitution, this assumption may not be very realistic, particu larly for those materials which do not have diversified uses in their applications. Prices may rise within certain limits with little effect on demand, but once a particular threshold is crossed, demand may fall dramatically and make the use of a competitive substitute more attrac tive. Such sharp variations can occur in the short-and medium-term demand curves and they would be much more pronounced in the long run where technological innovation by its very nature, exerts its influence, in a highly unpredictable manner.
Therefore, changes in relative prices of com peting materials alone may trigger little imme diate shift in demand. It is more likely that the cost not only of materials but also of other factor inputs, and the specific properties of materials, performance and quality considerations, etc., are taken into account. In other words, the only relevant cost in materials substitution today is the so-called "total package cost''.^ Many new *]n the case of the United States, scrap accounted in 1986 for 25% and 45% of the primary production of aluminium and copper, respectively. Depending on production costs/prices of primary and secondary origins, producers change from one pro curement source to the other or a mix of the two.
*'As an example, the major advantage of aluminium over copper in the stringing of overhead power cables is the former's lighter weight, thus requiring fewer pylons per unit length than would be needed in the case of copper (Dresher, 1986) . Therefore, materials are priced higher than the traditional ones they displace. However, these new mate rials may be preferred because they ofer the opportunity to reduce manufacturing costs suffi ciently to offset their higher prices (Fraser and others, 1987) . These factors work in conjunction with other demand/supply factors such as domestic natural resource endowment, govern ment industrial promotion programmes and cul tural and traditional factors, as well as the country's per capita income level.
Effects on com parative advantages and the international division o f labour
The preceding examination gives the impres sion that the demand prospects for commodities in which the countries of the Third World have been supposed to hold clear comparative advan tages are uncertain and that this advantage seems to have been badly eroded by the current restructuring of commodity demand propelled by new technologies. Moreover, presumably highly labour-intensive sectors, such as textiles, clothing and assembly of electric goods, are slowly increasing their capital intensity, thanks to the incorporation of a higher technology con tent in production processes (ECLAC, 1988) .
The consequences of the energy-and materials-saving efforts in the developed world are manifold. Since basic processing activities are energy-intensive and there is a limit to the capacity to recycle wastes, a natural sequence of events has been the relocation of the production of traditional industrial materials to developing regions. The chief aims are to obtain raw mate rials and energy at lower cost, save on the trans port of raw materials, and take advantage of less rigorous environmental restrictions and the in this application the relative cost o i the m aterials is of secondary im portance to the economy realized in the installed system, A sim ilar exam ple is found in the beverage packaging industry; the cost o f producing an aluminium tw o-piece beverage container is substantially higher than the cttst of a tinplate counterpart, but aluminium cans are less than half of the weight of tinplate cans, putting the form er in a much more favoured position with respect to transport costs. In addition, aluminium cans do not rust or alter the taste of beverages, as tinplate cans are alleged to do, and they are easier and cheaper to recycle (D elm er, 198.^). flexibility inherent in geographical proximity to raw material production sites. In spite of dimin ishing materials intensity, access to cheaper supplies gives companies a competitive edge as long as the require these inputs. It is also possi ble to create or strengthen comparative advan tage; Latin America has been able substantially to transform its basket of export goods in the present decade by accelerated introduction of non-traditional products such as oilseeds and vegetable oils, fruits and fruit juices, shellfish, fish and fish products, wood and pulp, and poul try, the production of which is basically resource and labour intensive.
Another consequence might point in a dif ferent direction; style and quality specialization by developing countries in the production of certain commodity groups or components which are simpler and relatively less expensive and more labour intensive. Developing countries will probably continue to identify and exploit trade and production opportunities in such pro ducts. In the case of steel, for instance, a particu lar kind of division of labour has developed in recent decades with most developing countries producing ordinary steels and some industrial ized or newly industrialized countries (NIEs) competing among themselves for the special steels market. While exports of footwear from developing countries will continue to be most successful in high-volume, low-cost markets, producers in developed and a few developing countries compete fully in the fashion market. The new textile machinery introduced in deve loped countries allows enterprises to be more flexible in production which is of higher quality with greater emphasis on styling and design, and to shift from the mass production of fabrics, common in developing countries, to shorter runs of high-quality fabrics. The types of finer yarns and lightweight fabrics increasingly sought in the apparel trade are produced by highly auto mated textile plants.
It is worth noting the following observations by Duncan (1988) : i) the Third World's share of world product ion/exports of raw materials has increased for almost ail products and is projected to continue increasing in the future; and ii) the shift of production/exports to the Third World has been accompanied by an increase in the lat ter's share in processing. In other words, the production/exports of these products have shifted and will continue to shift in favour of developing countries, partly offsetting the dec lining growth trend at the global level. The most likely outcome of the spread of new technologies seems to be therefore that production will con tinue to relocate to the South in the search for comparative advantage, and that there will be neither a massive return of manufacturing pro duction to the North or a dramatic deterioration of the export prospects of Latin America as a whole.
II
The use-intensity hypothesis: its usefulness and persuasiveness for the Third World
The use-intensity hypothesis: its concept and implications
There has been a fair amount of literature on the so-called use-intensity concept. It is generally defined as consumption of the product in ques tion per unit of economic activity at constant prices. Its purpose is to isolate the impact on demand of factors other than the size and growth of the national macroeconomy. It is usu ally expressed in tons (or kilos) per million con stant dollars of GDP. It postulates that use-intensity is closely correlated with the level of economic develop ment, as measured for instance by per capita GDP, and that the intensity rises up to a certain threshold and then starts to fall as the economy matures. The reason for this inverted U-shaped relationship is that after the materials-intensive stages, during infrastructure building and the development of manufacturing and metal working, markets for industrial products reach a certain degree of saturation and technologically more sophisticated industries and services come to represent a more rapidly growing share of GDP than the traditional materials-intensive activities. In addition, over time technological progress makes it possible to produce a given set of products with ever-decreasing inputs of mate rials. This effect might permit late-comers to development to leapfrog over the materialsintensive stages of the pioneers and adopt the most up-to-date materials-saving technologies.
In short, the hypothesis suggests that: i) useintensity at a given level o f econom ic develop ment will be lower in countries which are late-comers; and ii) use-intensity at a given point in time will be higher for middle-income countries than for low-income ones, whose intensity will rise over time up to a certain thre shold. This means, on the one hand, that even though many developing countries may continue to increase their share in the world product or in movements of capital and consumer durables, their future materials demand and use-intensity will not necessarily reach the levels achieved in the past by the DMECs at comparable income levels. But, on the other, it also means that devel oping regions, with a substantially lower level of intensity or consumption per capita, should be regarded as untapped markets for many raw materials and se mi-processed products for some time to come, pointing to the importance of domestic, intrarégional and interregional market expansion in the Third World.
The examination of use-intensity in the DMECs gives certain substance to the oftenraised concern that reduced demand is due to the changes in the composition of GDP and in the material composition of products. The useintensity in these countries for petroleum, steel, copper, tin and to a lesser degree, lead and zinc (the case of aluminium is more ambiguous) has consistently declined during the last 15 years (for a detailed analysis, see ECLAC, 1989) . In steel, for instance, Japan, the country with the highest intensity among the DMECs, reduced its level from 114.5 tons/million (in 1980 dollars of GDP) in 1973 to 55.7 tons in 1984. France, a low-intensity country, also reduced it from 55.9 tons in 1962 to 22.1 tons in 1984, without ever reaching a level comparable to the other DMECs. The most striking reduction has been in the case of tin whose use-intensity in recent years in the DMECs has been approximately one-third of the levels of the 1960s. Tin consumption in the United States, for example, dropped from a high of 59 100 tons in 1973 to 38 000 tons in 1986.
In spite of the spottiness of consumption data, it is possible to construct a similar intensity series for developing countries as a whole (Murray, 1988) and for Latin America in particu lar (ECLAC, 1989) . This series seems to suggest that the countries of the Third World find them selves at a stage of increasing intensity -a pro cess temporarily interrupted by the fall in investment caused mainly by the debt crisis.
It is equally important to recognize that the levels of per capita consumption of many com modities in Latin America are extremely low in relation to the leaders under this heading (see ECLAC, 1989) . The world's highest per capita consumption in 1985 of 607 kg in Japan, 505 in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 440 in the United States stands in stark contrast to the region's top consumers: Mexico 96 kg, Brazil 88 kg, Argentina 72 kg, and Chile 47 kg. Per capita consumption in developing countries generally stands at 10-20 kg rather than in the 100-200 kg range of the Asian NIEs, such as Taiwan, Pro vince of China, and the Republic of Korea. This huge gap in consumption, which is exhibited in other metals (see table 2), seems to suggest that there persists an extremely high potential for expanding production in developing countries. The rapid adjustment of industrial structure in the DMECs should further encourage this process.*" During the past quarter of a century the developing countries (including China) increased their share of non-CMEA GDP from 19% in I960 to 24% in 1988. This modest change has brought with it a major increase in "'For instance, in Japan, the five largest steel mills have launched a programme to reduce by 1990 their combined capacity from I ^0 milli{>n to 90 million tons and to cut the work force by at least In this Asian country, primary aluminium production dropped from 1.2 million tons in 1977 to 0.25 million tons in 1985, while new projects tapped this metal in Brazil, Venezuela, India and Indonesia. the developing countries' share of world metals demand. In 1985, for instance, their share of world metals consumption was 12.6% for prim ary aluminium, 12.3% for primary refined copper, 14.2% for lead, and 13.4% for primary tin (UNCTAD, 1987 c). These figures, which are not even adjusted for the metals contained in the net flow of semimanufactures and manufactures, clearly suggest that the developing countries do play an important role in determining the level of world metals demand (Murray, 1988) . And these percentages should have been higher if the fall in investment as a proportion of GDP which took place after 1982 in the Third World had been taken into account. Therefore, the combi nation of rising use-intensity and rising indus trial production could be a potential force in sustaining world demand for metals.
Examination of these industrial metals points to the conclusion that most developing countries find themselves at a development stage, where the unit input of materials and energy needed to produce an additional unit of GDP is likely to expand for some years to come. Any reductions in per capita materials require ments thanks to miniaturization, saving and substitution might be offset by increasing requirements for materials, mostly traditional, owing to rapid population increase, the need for in frastru ctu re works, m aterialism and consumerism.** The concept of use-intensity cannot prop erly be applied to agricultural products, owing to their low income-elasticity. It appears more use ful to analyse instead their consumption growth pattern, especially for food and beverages. The effects of changes in income composition by product would be smaller in these cases. Accordingly, table 3 shows the trend in annual growth rates of consumption of certain farm products in three different periods (1963-"The more dynamic elasticity of traditional metals against new substitutes is supported by Duncan (1988) who thinks that the decline of metals in theDMCCs in the 1974-1985 period was largely cyclical rather than a reflection of a new downward trend in the rate of change in metal-saving technology or a change in output mix. The decline resulted mainly from the low rate of economic growth and the impact of high energy prices. In this view, recently resurgent capital investment in the DMLCs and depressed energy prices, which are likely to remain to some time, might reverse some of this dampening effect on materials demand.
T iibk 2 P E R C A P IT A C O N S U M P T IO N O F M E T A L S IN S E L E C T E D C O U N T R IE S , 1985
Countries Per capita (G D P ) 1972,1973'1984,1980-1984) , both in developed and in developing countries. In the food and beverages item, though the majority of its com ponents registered a slowdown in their world wide consumption between 1963-1972 and 1973-1984 , some have achieved an increase in developing regions. In the cases of sugar, tea and palm oil, consumption growth in developing countries more than offset the decline in con sumption in the DMECs. For the develoed world as a whole, only cocoa showed an upward trend between 1963-1972 and 1973-1984 , for food con sumption in these countries has been severely curbed. It is worth noting that even in the deve loped world some commodities -such as bovine meat, wheat, rice, coffee, cocoa, groundnuts, etc.-recorded an improvement in 1980-1984. Among agricultural raw materials two pro ducts, unmanufactured tobacco and jute products managed to improve their consumption rates worldwide. Both of them, assumed to have been battered either by health campaigns or by com petition from synthetic materials, also recorded an increasing rate in developing countries. In 1980-1984 the DMECs improved their consump tion rate for raw cotton, rubber, sisal, wool. This analysis points to diversified consump tion patterns among agricultural and metal pro ducts in different periods and regions. In addition to the level of economic development, other factors such as changes in consumer pref erences, the level of supply and demand influ enced by protectionism, and the pace of structural and technological change are having a strong effect on consumption patterns.
Limitations o f the concept, its applicability and factors responsible fo r varied consumption patterns among countries
The concept of use-intensity is a useful instru ment for predicting future consumption patt erns of developed and developing countries. However, it is important to bear in mind several restrictions inherent in the concept itself. Firstly, data on consumption at the country level reflect the measurement of consumption in manufacturing activities rather than "final' con- Table 3 T The applicability of the hypothesis is also somewhat reduced by the fact that technological progress which influences demand takes place in a discontinuous and irregular manner, and that the consumption pattern of materials have been strongly affected by big demand spurts as new markets open up for individual products. Wellknown cases are the introduction of the Bessemer process late in the last century which made possible the large-scale production of steel, and the emergence of the electrical industry which created a new huge market for copper. Problems arise when a similar level of per capita GDP at constant prices is achieved between countries so many years apart for during the gap it is highly possible for a series of demand aug menting/reducing technologies to emerge. Extreme examples are the United States and Brazil, which attained a level of per capita GDP inconstant 1980 dollars of US$1 500 at points in time roughly 100 years apart, and the United States and Mexico of US$2 580 roughly 75 years apart. The study by Radetzki (1987) reveals that the use-intensity hypothesis -a lower intensity at the same level of income for a late-comer-is vindicated only in the case of lead in a United States-Brazil comparison, and for the United States and Mexico the hypothesis holds for copper, lead and zinc, but not for aluminium, nickel and steel.
As the Radetzki analysis asserts, there art additional factors which distort the predictions of the hypothesis. His study of India points first to the role of government policies that affect the consumption levels of materials. A high useintensity in three metal-intensive sectors (i.e., manufacturing, railways and electricity, gas and water) reflected India's option for heavy indus try and infrastructure in its 1955-1965 develop ment plans. Secondly, regardless of the supply of natural resources, a foreign-exchange shortage might encourage the government to pursue sub stitution of materials highly dependent on imports, with the aim of achieving greater selfsufficiency. For a long time, India's domestic output has met a very high proportion of its aluminium and steel needs, while a half or more of the consumption requirements for copper, lead and zinc have to be imported. Therefore, the government's encouragement of the consump tion of the former and discouragement of the latter resulted in a consumption pattern quite different from what was expected.'^ Govern ment promotion of some selected products, as in India, would lead to changes in relative prices, with import duties commonly used for this pur pose. Supply shortages due to production rigidi ties or inefficient import planning and, last but not least, cultural factors also affect materials demand in patterns appreciably different from those postulated by the hypothesis. This suggests that it is possible to create a number of final demands leading to intensive use of available natural resources of national or regional importance. It is also possible to iden tify some end-uses (for example, the electrical and electronics sector for copper) which are expanding faster than industrial production both in the industrial world and in the develop ing countries. The fact that the intensity of some end-uses has shown major improvement, even for products whose overall consumption growth is negative, points to the differentiated perfor mance of each product which is usually hidden by the overall trend. This, in turn, reconfirms the importance of systematic research and develop ment as a means of finding new uses and products.
'^The government decree to use only aluminium in electricity transmission and domestic wiring increased the use-intensity of aluminium and decreased that of copper from the late I960s.
III
Some strategic area for improvement and co-operation
Technological com petitiveness o f Latin America in international trade
A fundamental condition for successful and sus tained technological innovation that generates new or improved products, processes or services is that financial and human resources should be directed to that end. Though it is true that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the available volume of resources and the desired result, countries which make large investmens in R&D have generally secured much better market opportunities than those which do not. One esti mate (UNCTAD, 1987 e) suggests that in 1983 the world's R&D expenditure exceeded US$265 billion, and that of this total the DMECs and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe accounted for US$192 billion and US$64 billion respec tively, leaving about US$9 billion for the Third World. In terms of total R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP, the figure for the DMECs as a whole in the first half of the 1980s was around 2.4% whereas for Latin America it was at 0.5% (UNESCO, 1987) . This R&D indicator coupled with others such as the number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D, professionals and technicians as a percentage of the economically active population, literacy rate and education standards, however, puts Latin America in a better position than Asia and Africa (Teitel, 1986; UNCTAD, 1987 e) . Nonetheless, the abso lute amount is important from the point of view of the potential capacity to innovate, and in this respect the region is entirely deficient: for instance, the volume of technological resources available for Brazil, Argentina and Mexico taken together at the beginning of the 1980s was sim ilar to that of General Motors in the United States (ECLAC/ UNIDO, 1985) . The absolute and relative paucity of the region's R&D expenditure implies a need for selectivity. It then follows that developed countries are and will be specializing increasingly in hightechnology producion, which requires a high level of human capital and extensive R&D, and that it is in these high-technology industries that they are seeking to maintain or strengthen their international competitiveness in production and trade. Nevertheless, it should also be recognized that in recent years the high-technology exports of developing countries have become an integral part of international trade (UNCTAD, 1987 e).
To define and calculate the technology inten sity or content of a product is a complicated task. Despite a number of inherent difficulties and ambiguities, it is still useful to examine, as UNCTAD (1987 e) has done, the region's basic competitive positions in international trade according to levels of technological sophistica tion. The criterion for the classification is the relative importance of R&D activities as mea sured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to pro duction. ** All products are assessed in terms of five SITC (Standardized International Trade Classification) digits. They are classified accord ing to the above-mentioned R&D intensity into three main categories -high, medium and low technology.^'* It is important to point out that most products in the low group and some in the medium group are naturally resource-intensive and that most of them are products which undergo little processing and can thus be consi dered as commodities as genetically defined.
"Obviously, there are certain limitations to a measure of this kind, A list of such products will change over time as new products are developed and as the production technologies of existing pro ducts become more widely disseminated and standardized. Moreover, this measure does not fully measure the technology content of the putducts manufactured by an industry, since indus tries may differ in the degree to which they rely on their own R&D efforts, as distinct from utilizing technology from other industries or impt>rted from abroad.
R&D intensity industries are aerospace, office machines and computers, electronics and components, drugs, instruments and electrical machinery. Medium R&D intensity industries include automobiles, chemicals, other manufacturing industries, non-electrical machinery, rubber and plastics and nonferrous metals. Low R&D intensity industries arc stone, clay and glass, food and beverages, tobacco, shipbuilding, petroleum refin eries, ferrous metals, processed metal prtKlucts, paper and print ing, w(xk1, cork and furniture, and textiles, ftHJtwear and leather. Annual growth rate (percentages) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1965 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 Statistical data on the composition of the imports of manufactures of the DMECs by cate gory of R&D intensity and major region of origin (see table 4) reveal the changing competi tiveness of developing countries in these markets. The table suggests first that although they still account for a relatively small propor tion of total manufactures trade, the products of high R&D intensity industries have tended to be among the relatively more rapidly growing exports for all groups of coutries. Also, indus tries with high and medium R&D intensity have been increasing their relative contribution to total exports, whereas that of the low R&D intensity group has been falling. Although the growth rate of these exports declined steadily over the period, the deceleration was less pro nounced for the developing countries as a whole than for the rest of the world. In 1985 the DMECs accounted for more than three-quarters of the market share of imports of manufactures of the high-and medium-intensity industries. In sectors with low R&D intensity, these countries still maintained a market share close to 60%. What is noticeable, however, is the significant inroads made by developing countries.
Among the developing regions, the market shares of Latin America rose slightly throughout the 15-year period in both the high-and medium-intensity industries. It is important to note that the performance of Latin America, in comparison with Asia*' during the same period, has been much less impressive in terms of abso lute trade values and of growth, for all three R&D categories. This is a result, on the one hand, of the Asian countries' efforts to promote high-tech exports, especially of electronic com ponents, telecommunications equipment, and non-electrical and electrical machinery, and on the other, of their serious efforts to improve their position in manufactures with low R&D intensity, mainly through the processing of raw materials.
In general, the use of new technologies does not seem up to now to have prevented develop ing countries -including both the leading NIEs and the others-from increasing the growth of their exports and generally enlarging their shares in total DMEC imports of a large range of manufactures. An outward-looking trade policy, as practiced in the majority of Asian countries and in parts of Latin America, offers dynamic potential benefits for exports expansion based primarily on natural resources and low labour costs. Admittedly, those developing countries with sufficient technological capacity to absorb these innovations will be in a position to main tain or even improve their export shares, while those countries lacking the necessary skills, know-how, institutional flexibility and a basic capital goods industry are more likely to fall behind. Enhanced export competitiveness requires greater diversification and integration ''Asia consists oi South, South-East and East Asia and the Middle East. Latin America includes the countries of the Caribbean.
of production structures, especially development of linkages with input-producing home indus tries and other input-supplying economic sectors.
Processing
The interest in local processing as an economic objective for developing countries arises from a variety of reasons. They include: i) increase in the product's value-added; ii) reduction in export earnings fluctuation; iii) promotion of economic "linkages" in the national economy; iv) control over marketing and pricing and the possibility of obtaining monopoly and resource profits; and v) the potential for enhancing infor mation about the industry and the market.
Examination of Latin American trade in commodities reveals a typical structure in which the countries in the region export goods in a primary state and then import the same goods from outside the region once they have been processed. An ECLAC (1986 a) study, which reviews Latin American exports to and from the OECD countries of 20 major commodities at three different processing levels (i.e., primary, semi-processed and processed), accords with this conclusion. The study shows that although in 1984 the value of the region's exports of these commodities to OECD was six times higher than that of its imports, most of the commodities were exported with minimum processing. Meanwhile, the region imported these same products for further processing.*^ It should be stressed that the term "processed products" ref ers only to commodities and excludes the subse quent phases of advanced manufacturing and industrial processing.
Over the years the proportion of developing countries' commodity production which is locally processed has increased. Local processing 'Mn agricultural products, the process!tig-level shares of the region's exports to OliCD were as follows: primary, 64<X\ semiprocessed, 16^^ t and processed, 20% . The respective percentages for OliCD commodity exports were 41 % , 3 1 % and 28%., A high proportion of semi-processed and pnKessed products imported from OliCD was noticed, but the regional imports of commodities was important as well. In the minerals and metals sector, the situation was mure dramatic: only 22% of regional exports con sisted of processed products, whereas 77% of the imports from OECD involved processed products. and the relative importance of processed imports by the DMECs from developing coun tries grew fairly rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, but in a majority of cases it has been slowing down ever since. Moreover, in recent times a significant portion of imports by developed countries of certain processed commodities, such as those based on iron ore, cotton and wood, have originated not from the developing countries producing the raw materials but from the ones importing and processing them, notably the NIEs of Asia. Some statistical estimates (UNCTAD, 1987 a and c) of the degree of pro cessing among different developing regions tend to accord with the view that Latin America as a whole processes a smaller proportion of the same products exported to developed countries than does its Asian counterpart.
The great processing potential of the Latin American region can be easily illustrated by looking at its shares in world mineral reserves and world ores and metals production. Table 5 makes it clear that in spite of being more favour ably endowed with mineral reserves and having a greater mine production than Asia in bauxite, copper, lead, zinc and iron ore, the region's share in these products at the refined metal stages are not significantly different or even lower. A most striking case is iron ore, where both reserves and mine production appreciably exceed those of Asia, but raw steel production is 75% below Asia's. This low rate of processing of traditional metals is partly due to the fact that the region's share in world consumption for each of the seven metals is substantially lower. Though not shown in the table, the region's participation in semimanufactures production from these metals is also negligible (see World Bureau of Metal Statistics).
The expansion of downstream activities in this sector means, therefore, strengthening of sectoral policies in favour of local processing and generating a series of final demands which involves intensive and rational use of abundant natural resources. The production of semimanu factures and finished products offers greater flexibility in scaling down plant sizes and many opportunities to increase horizontal integration at the national and regional levels (UNIDO, 1989) . This process should favour the selective expansion of activities which will bring with them sustained technological progress, as well as the generation and adequate incorporation of the so-called high technologies in selected areas.
Redirection o f commodities trade
One potential line of action with the present technological capabilities of Latin America is to redirect its trade inwards. Despite what the available studies indicate (ECLAC, 1986 b; Sanz Guerrero, 1986; INTAL, 1986) -that the region possesses a high potential for increasing its intrarégional trade in commodities-this trade amounts to little in practice and it has greatly diminished during the 1980s. In 1983-1985, total intrarégional trade in non-fuel commodities stood at 8%: during this period, the region directed more than 62% of its commodity exports to the DMECs, while roughly 20% and 10% were absorbed by the socialist countries and the other developing regions respectively. Asian markets alone took 6% of its commodity exports. Intra-Latin American trade in commod ities is believed to be substantially lower than its trade in manufactured exports.
It is interesting to observe that the ratio of intrarégional commodities trade is not only at a low level but is also of minor importance when compared with other developing regions. Dur ing the last two decades Asia managed to increase its intrarégional trade in non-fuel com modities by a substantial margin: from 22.5% (1966-1970) to 27.9% (1975-1979) and to 34.0% (1983) (1984) (1985) . Asia has been able to increase this ratio in a consistent manner in each of the major categories of product: foodstuffs, agricultural raw materials, and minerals and ores. To a lesser degree the African region has managed to increase this ratio, also in each of the three categories (UNCTAD, 1987 c) .
An ECLAC study (1986 b) which analyses the region's commodity trade structure by origin and destination at a more disaggregated level (five SITC digits), shows clearly the magnitude of the potential to displace extraregional sources in favour of internal sources. As far as foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials are concerned, the potential for redirecting trade is particularly rich for such products as maize, wheat, sugar, soy bean and its by-products, and other oilseeds and oils. The most salient minerals and metals are Source: Kursten and others (1988) .
"Includes the United States and Qnada.
aluminium, iron and steel, and copper products. Petroleum and its by-products, with a high potential for regional self-sufficiency -regional exports to the rest of the world far exceed regional imports-have undoubtedly the high est potential. Using the trade figures of the mid1980s, the study suggests that intrarégional trade could be considerably expanded and that efforts to redirect trade in 40 products (fiveSITC digits) towards the region itself could increase regional trade in commodities by more than US$15 billion. There are substantial obstacles to full exploi tation of this potential. Tariffs are one of the major barriers and are usually applied indiscrim inately, regardless of supply origin. The regional tariff preferences (PAR) system within the framework of ALADI is in many cases insignifi cant, and a large number of products is excluded from it. In addition, a series of para-tariff mea sures is applied, in most cases uniformly and without differentiation as to origin. A major non-tariff barrier is known to be transport costs, which clearly favour procurement from outside the region (INTAL,1986) . Marketing services and financing, totally deficient in the region, are heavily dependent on the channels of TNCs or developed-country governments, which are hardly likely to increase regional trade.
Regional co-operation in this direction should be emphasized at times when, as is now the case, the region's commodity exports are facing growing protectionism in the markets of developed economies, whose demand for a number of commodities is becoming more satu rated. The growth of regional trade should be encouraged not only in order to economize on the region's meagre external resources and pro mote regional food security, but also in order to exploit the differences in consumption levels between developed and developing regions. It should be stressed that the scope for regional trade should increase substantially once the countries of the region have achieved a higher volume of commodity processing.
Marketing and prom otion
Medium-and long-term promotion of demand has to do with the industrial organization of the product. It is interesting to compare aluminium and copper in this respect, for their situation holds important lessons for other commodities. The high growth rate in aluminium consump tion -over 8.5% a year in 1960-1979 compared with 3-5% to 4.0% for copper-can be attrib uted not only to the properties of aluminium itself and its comparatively recent introduction as an industrial material but also to the high degree of industrial integration prevailing in the bauxite/alumina/aluminium industry. The most outstanding features of this industry have been; a stable pricing system, at least up until recently; the orderly development of production capacity; a large volume of research aimed at and concen trated on expansion of use; and the ability of the major transnational producers to invest in manufacturing facilities to bring new products onto the markets. By contrast, the efforts to discover, develop and promote new uses for copper have not proven sufficient, rather, the industry has centered its efforts on expanding production (Kuczynski, 1982; Morales, 1987; others, 1985-1986) .
The gradual vertical "de-integration" of the copper industry since the Second World War has produced a situation in which copper passed increasingly through the final markets semima nufacturers, who are many in number and have no links, either formal or informal, with raw materials producers. These semimanufacturers, also producing items made of other metals, have no special interest in promoting copper over the others. Primary copper producers, on the other hand, do not have access to final consumption markets where demand is actually determined. The lack of market intelligence about the requirements of end-manufacturers has made it difficult for them to promote copper. The lack of an information feed-back system has to some degree prevented materials producers from pro gressively integrating themselves in more diver sified product groups with greater processing. In this light, attempts at progressive integration made by the producers themselves or in joint ventures should receive a high priority.
Since copper has much higher price instabil ity than aluminium, a factor which has adversely affected its use, any promotion strategy must involve the establishment of an appropriate pricing policy. This might result in renewed support for some price stabilization schemes either in the form of international agreements or other arrangements. If price fluctuation is reduced, the efforts to promote consumption, maintain competitiveness with other substi tutes, or find new uses can be sustained. Progres sive in teg ratio n into more advanced manufacturing processes should also help to reduce price instability.
A fundamental strength of the aluminium industry in research and promotion is the large amount of funds which a company like ALCAN or ALCOA allocates to these objectives (major companies spend more than US$100 million annually) and the basic nature of these efforts. By contrast, some estimates suggest that in 1985 the copper industry as a whole spent about 0.1% of the total value of sales of refined copper on marketing and research. Taking into account the reiterated importance of R&D on new and tradi tional uses with sufficient financial backing, it might be beneficial to strengthen research capa bilities through agreements and co-operation among producer governments and international research organizations.
In the case of agricultural raw materials, it is important to note that some natural products have maintained or regained their competitive edge in some end-uses owing mainly to their technical properties (for a summary on this topic, see ECLAC, 1989) . As in cotton, product differentiation designed to change consumer preferences in favour of natural products by emphasizing their "natural" characteristics (their appearance and moisture absorbency, coupled with improvements in processing to make them harder-wearing), has played an important role in market promotion. The stan dardization of materials and use of appropriate brandnames, as in the case of "Woolmark" has enhanced uniformity in quality and secured bet ter prices than synthetic blends. Leather, with the appeal of high-quality consumer goods, espe cially in the DMECs, has transformed itself from a utilitarian raw material into a fashion and prestige product. Natural rubber's share of the world elastomers market has declined only slightly, thanks to the gains achieved in the tire sectors of the DMECs, especially through the massive shift from cross-ply to radial tires and the increase in heavy-duty tire production.
On the other hand, for products which have no clear technical advantages over synthetics and must therefore compete mainly on the ground of price (as in the case of jute and sisal), priority should be given to production research. This is aimed at lowering costs and enabling production to be maintained at the price dictated by the synthetic competitor.
Marketing ability is closely associated with the role of trading agents in gathering/proces sing/disseminating market inform ation (Kuwayama, 1988) . Appropriate and timely decisions on production, marketing and invest ment require a correct understanding not only of the local conditions in trading partner countries but also of the international macroeconomic indicators (for example, movements of interest rates, currencies and prices of "financial" assets -all of which affect commodity prices). With the development of advanced technologies, par ticularly high-speed information processing, which has led to increasingly widespread "pro gramme trading" and round-the-clock trading among commodity exchanges, commodity markets are now more than ever before an inte gral part of the overall financial operations of international investors. This feature implies in turn the need for developing countries to create a market intelligence infrastructure competent enough to assess the creditworthiness of clients and the desired prices and profit margins.
Furthermore, marketing, processing and increases in intrarégional trade are intricately related, since the possibilities of pre-export pro cessing depend on the ability to secure before hand market outlets for the processed product. Prior assurance of market possibilities is often a requisite for raising the necessary investment funds. Levels of intrarégional trade also depend on the capacity of regional bodies to take over the related services provided up to now mostly by TNCs. From this standpoint, the strengthen ing of the existing ( national or regional) market ing bodies and/or the creation of new ones, with a much more consolidated information and financial base seems an urgent necessity.
